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Cote d’Ivoire: Will the peace deal hold? PDF Print E-mail
Written by Zachary Ochieng – Afrika.no   
Wednesday, 16 January 2008
A briefing by Dorina Bekoe, senior research associate at the institute’s Centre for Conflict Analysis and Prevention titled Côte d’Ivoire: Ensuring a Peaceful Political Transition, traces the political crisis to September 2002 when military officers protested the government’s decision to demobilise them, a move seen by others as an attempted coup d’état. The uprising generated other rebel groups, which took control over the northern part of the country and ignited a civil war. Even after the fighting ceased, the country remained divided, with northern Côte d’Ivoire devoid of public services or states administration. The Ouagadougou Political Accord (OPA) is the sixth peace agreement directed at ending the political crisis.

The previous five were never fully implemented due to, among other factors, disagreements about the selection of the mediator, the absence of political will among the signatories, and the tense relationship between the government of Côte d’Ivoire and the United Nations.

Under the OPA, a new government of national unity is in place to undertake the tasks necessary to organise elections and guide the country out of the political crisis. President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso mediated the negotiations leading to the signing of the OPA, and Burkina Faso is the facilitator of the agreement’s implementation. Key preconditions include providing identification cards to undocumented residents; demobilising and disarming the Forces Nouvelles (FN) rebel movement, and the militia groups; updating the voters’ registry; and organising elections. With grievances over citizenship and identity at the heart of the political crisis, the identification process is among the most critical tasks. The US Initiative for Peace and the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding-Côte d’Ivoire organised a workshop in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, from November 6-9, 2007, on strategies to ensure a peaceful political transition and electoral process. The workshop — jointly opened by Fatoumata Traore, the vice president of the independent Electoral Commission, and Moussa Soro of the Ministry for African Integration — included about 50 civil society organisations (CSOs) from all parts of the country, representing the media, human rights and democracy advocates, economic development groups and religious and traditional leaders.

The workshop had three inter-related goals: To increase knowledge of electoral violence, build civil society’s capacity to prevent violence and defuse tension, and create an information-sharing network of CSOs.

Participants compared elections that had taken place in Togo, Benin, Ghana, Zanzibar and Tanzania. This comparative approach was used to draw lessons for Côte d’Ivoire’s presidential elections — now scheduled for June 2008 — and outline the likely roles for civil society. Secondly, through panels on democracy, social reconciliation and peacebuilding, and the role of regional and international organisations, the workshop aimed to strengthen the capacity of civil society to prevent conflict in Côte d’Ivoire’s upcoming elections. The OPA called for the creation of a new transitional government to guide the country through implementation and, eventually, presidential elections. To this end, Mr Soro was designated prime minister in March 2007. He named a 33-member Cabinet drawn from political parties and civil society. The new government includes nine members from the ruling Front Populaire Ivoirien; seven members from the FN; five representatives each from the Rassemblement des Républicaines and Parti Démocratique de Côte d’Ivoire; and seven members representing civil society and smaller political parties.
 
At its signing, the OPA was expected to be implemented over 10 months, culminating in presidential elections. Some of the tasks are creation of both an integrated command centre and committee to oversee the implementation process; establishment of a transitional government; replacement of UN military officers with police and military units from both the FN and the government in the Zone of Confidence — a buffer zone between the north and south; demobilisation, disarmament, and cantonments of militia units and fighting forces; the extension of the state’s administration throughout the country and the re-launching of mobile courts to provide undocumented residents with identification cards indicating their citizenship or legal status. Others are voter registration and the issuance of identity and voters’ cards; and the unification of the FN and the national army into a new army and the integration of some ex-combatants into a new civic service programme. Nine months from the signing of the OPA, only a few tasks have been fulfilled. The transitional government has established the integrated command centre and the implementation monitoring committee, deployed mixed units in the Zone of Confidence, held a ceremony to mark the start of disarmament and demobilisation, started the redeployment of state employees to all parts of the country, and re-launched the mobile courts.

The implementation of the OPA has been particularly problematic in the process of demobilisation, disarmament, and cantonment; the extension of the state’s administration; and the relaunching of the mobile courts. Demobilisation and disarmament began in May 2007 with the collection of 555 weapons brought in by four western militia groups. It was followed up with a ceremonial burning of weapons in the rebel-stronghold of Bouaké in July, which the government termed La Flamme de la Paix (Flame of Peace). However, since then disarmament has not proceeded. Moreover, the FN and the Ivorian national army have been unable to agree on how many members of the FN should be integrated into a new army and how military ranks used by the FN should be transferred to the new army. The extension of the state’s administration has not occurred. While many civil servants have been redeployed to posts in the north of the country, a region that had remained out of government control since the start of the crisis, many have returned to Abidjan, citing poor working conditions and infrastructure. Many areas of the country also remain without functioning public services.

Still, the briefing paper says, issues of identity and citizenship are at the core of the Ivorian crisis. In the 1995 and 2000 elections a new citizenship law resulted in many northerners claiming disenfranchisement and discrimination. Alassane Ouattara, a northerner, was disqualified from running in both presidential elections, when doubts about his citizenship arose. Indeed, a central grievance raised by the rebels is the high number of Ivorians (as many as three million) who do not have identity cards; as a result many suffer from discrimination and disenfranchisement, as they are perceived to be foreigners. Thus, the success of the mobile courts, which began operations in 25 locations at the end of September, is critical. So far, they have yielded approximately 80,200 identification documents out of about 84,800 requests, but the courts have been criticised for their slow pace. The state’s poor organisation, lack of information to citizens, and paucity of resources for the programme’s full implementation have been cited for the slow start of the identification process. The timely completion of the identification process is not just important to demonstrate the government’s commitment to the peace agreement, but also because the electoral commission is unable to begin updating the electoral registry until the identification process is complete. Recently, the Ivorian government took steps to move critical aspects of the implementation process forward. Additional funding for the mobile courts has resulted in greater efforts to increase the visibility of and information about the identification programme and the deployment of 30 more mobile courts.

On November 28, 2007, Gbagbo and Soro signed the second and third complementary agreements to the OPA. The second complementary agreement specified that the French firm, Sagem, would produce the identity and voter cards. Key components of the third complementary agreement, include a revision of the deadlines for demobilisation of militia units and recruitment into the civic service programme (December 22, 2007); the extension of the state’s administration (December 30, 2007); and the re-establishment of services throughout the country (January 30, 2008). It sets the election date for the end of June this year.

It specifies that the Burkinabe facilitator will decide how many members of the FN will be integrated into the new army and how the military ranks of FN officers would be treated in the new integrated army.

Many participants questioned the depth, substance, and direction of the peace process underway. In particular, some wondered if the country placed too much emphasis on the symbolic aspects of the implementation process — such as “La Flamme de la Paix” — instead of more substantial programmes that ensured that demobilisation and disarmament proceeded apace. Noting that peace could not be possible without reconciliation, many were also divided on the structure of reconciliation efforts.

Others felt that it was too soon to call for national reconciliation, emphasising instead the opportunities for dialogue to air grievances. However, participants agreed that reconciliation must take place before elections and must occur at the grassroots level.
Last Updated ( Tuesday, 15 January 2008 )